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ABSTRACT
One competing technology proposed for the New Millennium Program Space Technology 9 (ST9) mission
demonstrates controlled propulsion using a solar sail deployed from Orbital’s MicroStarTM spacecraft bus platform.
The ST9 Solar Sail Mission’s (ST9-SSM) proposed solar sail allowed nearly 1,000 m2 of reflective area by
extending four gossamer sail quadrants along inflatable, thermally rigidized 24.2 m booms. To measure sail
performance from the ground, a 1250 km circular, sun-synchronous dawn-dusk orbit was selected to maximize
available sunlight on the sail and minimize the atmospheric drag and radiation effects. Several performance
challenges drove the ST9-SSM spacecraft bus design: minimum mass, stable attitude control, high-capacity image
processing, and a propulsion subsystem capable of achieving the starting mission orbit, as well as successful end of
life disposal, all while minimizing mass and maintaining compatibility with both of the two NASA-directed launch
vehicles. Additionally, ST9-SSM also posed programmatic challenges in the areas of risk management and cost
control. The ST9 Solar Sail mission concept not only demonstrates solar sail technology as a feasible means of
propulsion, but it also illustrates how a microsatellite platform can be used to deploy and execute such a mission for
a low cost with relatively low risk.

MISSION OVERVIEW

material which provides thrust via a momentum
exchange with light reflected from its surface.

Imagine a spacecraft that requires no propellant or
electrical power to maintain a polar orbit over the Earth,
the Sun, or even another astronomical body in our solar
system. Imagine a spacecraft that can reach a distance
of 200 AU in 15 to 20 years.1 Imagine a spacecraft
whose constant acceleration profile would allow it to
travel to our nearest neighboring star, Alpha Centauri,
and back within a human lifetime. Now imagine that
the first step toward these remarkable mission profiles
could be achieved by a microsatellite orbiting the earth
sun-synchronously at an altitude of 1250 km. This first
step is a working on-orbit demonstration of an
operational solar sail.

While the concept of using solar radiation pressure as a
method for in-space propulsion was first thought of in
1921 by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the concept would
remain a textbook oddity until technology had
sufficiently advanced to manufacture, launch, deploy,
and control a solar sail in orbit. Throughout the 1950s
and 1960s, many government-funded studies and
proposals using solar sailing technology refined the
industry’s understanding of how it would use a solar
sail if only it could build and deploy one.2
The early 1990s saw great advances in the quality of
micrometer-scale reflective membranes, as well as the
establishment of several different technologies
appropriate to deploying large structures in space. As
part of the New Millennium Program’s Space
Technology series of missions, the concepts for flight
validation of a solar sail were developed through
studies associated with Space Technology 5 and Space
Technology 7. Meanwhile, the In-Space Propulsion
Technologies Project at Marshall Space Flight Center

The notion of sailing in space as one would sail
terrestrially was first imagined by Johannes Kepler,
who posited that the tails of comets must be swept up in
some sort of breeze that could be used to propel a sail.
In fact, the solar wind, which is the source of comet
tails, is not useful for sailing in space. Rather, a solar
sail is a large, low-mass membrane of highly reflective
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worked between 2003 and 2006 to refine technologies
to manufacture, launch, and deploy an operational solar
sail. Roughly $35M of NASA investment yielded
vacuum deployments of two 10-m and two 20-m sail
systems, plus work on diagnostic systems and analytical
tools, including the ground-based solar sail thrust model
that ST9-SSM proposed to validate with flight data.

flown, would be to provide on-orbit demonstration of
the deployment, thrust, and control of the first
operational solar sail.
UNIQUE PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES
Demonstrating on-orbit deployment, thrust, and
control—not very different from the Wright Brothers’
challenge of demonstrating lift, thrust, and control, as
indicated in Figure 2—posed challenges not just to the
mission but to the spacecraft designers.

Also during the 1990s and into this century, the
commercial and private sectors took notice of the
concept of solar sailing. Despite the enormous amount
of research and development necessary to bring an
operational solar sail online, Team Encounter of
Houston, TX invested in a solar sail spacecraft to
market to individuals who wished to have a lock of
their hair and a few lines of their favorite poetry flown
in space. Speaking volumes for the charismatic appeal
of solar sails to the general public, the Planetary Society
in June of 2005, funded entirely by its members,
launched COSMOS-1, which if not for a launch vehicle
mishap would have been the world’s first operational
solar sail.3 The COSMOS-1 sailcraft used a pinwheel
sail design intended to demonstrate the ability to
achieve thrust from solar radiation pressure, but it did
not provide means for measuring that thrust, or for
modeling or predicting sail shape, deployment
complexities, or attitude control. By the time of the prePhase A work for the New Millennium Program (NMP)
Space Technology 9 (ST9) mission in late 2005, two
technologies for delivering the sail payload had
emerged: mechanical deployment of the membrane on a
coilable mast, and pressurized deployment of the
membrane using inflatable booms. Using the second
method, only boom deployment depends on inflation;
once deployed the booms are thermally rigidized.
While both technologies posed advantages and
disadvantages, the inflatable structure design provided
by L’Garde Inc. was chosen as the baseline for the ST9
Solar Sail Mission (ST9-SSM) Phase A study, as shown
in Figure 1. The objective of the ST9-SSM mission, if

Figure 2: Taking “Lift, Thrust, and Control” to
“Deployment, Thrust, and Control”4
The ST9-SSM sailcraft consists of three payloads
mounted on a spacecraft bus. The first and most critical
payload is the solar sail itself, as shown in Figure 3. At
launch, it is stowed in its own self-contained payload
unit. Once on-orbit, the sail payload deploys using
pressurized gas and cools once deployed, and becomes
rigid. The second payload is the translating stage, a
pair of mechanisms which allow the location of the
center of mass (CM) to be controlled with respect to the
center of pressure (CP). This translating stage is used
during one phase of the mission to demonstrate that a

Figure 1: The ST9-SSM Sailcraft4
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mighty little spacecraft must do all of these things at the
most minimum mass possible. Putting these criteria
together makes a MicroStar a natural for meeting these
specific mission needs.

solar sail’s attitude can be controlled using only solar
radiation pressure.
These first two payloads provide propulsive force and
attitude control of the sailcraft as a whole during the
demonstration mission, with the spacecraft bus
monitoring conditions and ready to retake control if
attitude thresholds are exceeded. The last payload is a
camera system provided by the Planetary Society
capable of taking image data of the sail deployment and
the sail shape while it’s being used for solar radiation
pressure thrusting. These image data are necessary to
the mission to validate the solar radiation pressure
thrust models being demonstrated by the mission.

Orbit Selection
To achieve the ST9-SSM mission objectives of
demonstrating solar sail deployment, thrust, and attitude
control, the orbit selected needed to provide low drag,
good communications coverage, and the ability to
perform maneuvers, while still being accessible by the
smaller of the two allowable launch vehicles: a Pegasus
XL launch vehicle. Because the Delta II RHDPAF
launch vehicle option places the ST9-SSM directly into
its mission orbit, no special propulsion for orbit-raising
was required. This meant that the Pegasus XL launch
vehicle option presented the driving case for mission
orbit selection.

Figure 3: The ST9-SSM Sailcraft Consists of a Solar
Sail, a Translating Stage for Sail Attitude Control,
and a Sail Camera System4

Figure 4: Advantageous Selected Orbit Provides
Constant Sunlight for Sail Thrusting

Being able to demonstrate an on-orbit deployment of a
gossamer structure the size of a football field meant
providing a spacecraft bus that could not only provide
the propulsion system needed to achieve the
deployment orbit, but also withstand the fits and starts
of a pressurized deployment while maintaining a stable
attitude. A spacecraft bus that would allow the
measurement of solar radiation pressure thrust in the
solar sail would have to provide a means of preventing
and measuring leaks in the propulsion system to ensure
that no propulsive forces other than those from the
sun’s photons are measured. This spacecraft would
also need to support demonstration of attitude control
using only solar radiation pressure by supporting
alternate algorithms for its attitude control subsystem to
accommodate the solar radiation pressure attitude
actuators, and to step in and retake control of the
spacecraft in the event of a demonstration failure. An
additional challenge was to find a way to design the
sailcraft such that it could launch on either of the
NASA-directed launch vehicle options without any
configuration changes. Finally, and most critically, this
Kalmanson

An ideal low Earth orbit to demonstrate a working solar
sail is a circular, sun-synchronous orbit with its
ascending and descending nodes at 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.,
and an altitude that can vary between 1000 km and
1400 km, as shown in Figure 4. The altitude floor is
determined by atmospheric drag: orbits with altitudes
much lower than this will have high enough
perturbations due to atmospheric drag that separating
out the portion of thrust due only to solar radiation
pressure becomes difficult. On the other hand, an Earth
orbit with an altitude much above 1400 km will
experience heightened radiation from the Van Allen
belts that could prematurely degrade the sail membrane
material. Since a working solar sail mission would
generally not be stationed in the Earth’s radiation belts,
degradation due to radiation would not generally be
expected to pose insurmountable difficulties.
Using the Pegasus XL launch vehicle, a circular, sunsynchronous orbit as described above could be reached
with an altitude of 1040 km by first inserting into a
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The primary driver for sailcraft total mass was the
302.3 kg lift capacity of the Pegasus XL launch vehicle
to the 220 km by 1000 km starting orbit.

lower orbit and then using an on-board hydrazine
propulsion system to raise the orbit altitude.
Table 1: Final Spacecraft Bus Mass Budget
Mass
(kg)

Unc.
(%)

Total Mass
(kg)

24.5

20.0%

29.4

3.5

10.0%

3.8

Propulsion

13.0

6.0%

13.8

Attitude Control (NTE)

19.6

0.0%

19.6

Subsystem
Mechanical/Structure
Thermal

Command & Data Handling

9.3

4.4%

9.7

RF Communications

3.7

5.4%

3.9

12.4

14.5%

14.2

7.1

20.0%

8.5

93.1

10.5%

102.9

Electric Power
Harness
Spacecraft Bus Dry Mass

The payload, with its contingency included, was 64 kg,
allowing 238.3 kg to be divided between the spacecraft
bus and propellant, including contingency. In order to
maintain a 25% (75.5 kg) launch vehicle capability
margin, this left 162.8 kg for use by the spacecraft and
the propellant. The final solution for mass distribution
on the bus allowed 59.9 kg, including contingency, for
the propellant mass, and the remaining 102.9 kg,
including contingency, for the spacecraft bus dry mass.
In order to accommodate the 102.9 kg bus dry mass
ceiling, the bus dry mass without contingency had to be
no greater than 93.1 kg. To meet this low ceiling, the
ST9-SSM Phase A Study used Orbital’s MicroStarTM
bus with high heritage components and system design,
and an integrated avionics package referred to as the
MicroStar Avionics Unit (MAU). The block diagram
in Figure 11 shows the high-heritage nature of the final
system design. By consolidating all avionics functions
into the MAU, greater system capability could be
achieved at a lower mass. Spacecraft layout is shown
in Figure 5.

Mass Constraints
In order to maintain the necessary aerial density for the
integrated sailcraft, the total system mass had to be kept
to a minimum. Given this constraint, rather than use a
top-down mass allocation approach, each major portion
of the sailcraft provided a mass estimate and a
contingency to apply to that estimate, and these
contributions were then added together to determine
where mass needed to be trimmed in order to meet the
total system mass requirement, as shown in Table 1.

Figure 5: Spacecraft Layout Maximizes Capability with Minimum Mass and Volume
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margin of 6.91 mNm in the worst case scenario, as
shown in Table 2.

Consolidating the avionics also allowed greater
flexibility in the distribution of mass among the
subsystems. Performance driving subsystems like
attitude control could be allocated greater mass to allow
larger torquer bars, while subsystems with fewer
driving requirements could be pared down to an
optimized minimum.

Because the ST9-SSM mission occurs in low Earth
orbit, magnetic control is not only possible, but highly
desirable as a way to stabilize the sail under the gravity
gradient torques unique to a planetary orbit. While
interstellar and deep space missions would not
necessarily carry magnetic controls, they also would not
experience significant gravity gradient torque, just as
these missions would not experience disturbance
torques from atmospheric drag, as ST9-SSM does. The
gravity gradient torque, however, did not always pose a
disturbance torque. By carefully selecting the orbit and
the nominal attitude within that orbit, gravity gradient
torque provided a restoring torque to keep the sail in the
mission attitude, as shown in Figure 6.

Attitude Control
The ST9-SSM attitude control subsystem provides
control at any attitude in the mission orbit, and the
capability to slew up to 180 degrees within 30 minutes
to regain a sun-facing attitude from unexpected slews
due to shuttlecocking torques on the sail. Control at
any attitude is an important capability, because fighting
the gravity gradient torques in low Earth orbit could
overpower a smaller attitude control subsystem.
Because of the 6AM ascending node, circular, sunsynchronous orbit chosen, the baseline LVLH attitude
always provides sun on the solar arrays and on the sail
payload.
Being able to launch the sailcraft with appropriate
mass, however, is only the beginning of the challenge.
Once on-orbit, the sailcraft must be able to hold a
steady attitude while the sail deploys, and after that
maintain attitude control of a gossamer structure with
nearly 1000 m2 of area.
Table 2: Attitude Control Torque Summary

Torque Source

Type

Magnitude
at 1000 km
Altitude
(mNm)

Magnitude
at 1400 km
Altitude
(mNm)

Reaction Wheels

Control

12.00

12.00

Magnetic

Control

1.10

0.90

Sum of Control
Torques

Control

13.10

12.90

Atmospheric Drag

Disturbance

0.03

0.03

Gravity Gradient

Disturbance

4.20

3.50

Solar Radiation
Pressure (CP-CM
Offset)

Disturbance

0.86

0.86

Solar Radiation
Pressure
(Shuttlecock)

Disturbance

1.10

1.10

Sum of
Disturbance
Torques

Disturbance

6.19

5.49

Margin

6.91

7.41

Margin

Figure 6: Gravity Gradient Torque Helps Stabilize
Sail Attitude4
As the sail plane tries to move out of LVLH, the gravity
gradient torque pushes the sail back toward LVLH.
This provides additional stability during deployment
operations, with gravity gradient only acting as a
disturbance torque to be countered when attitudes out of
the LVLH plane are held for long periods of time.

The deployed sail system experiences maximum
disturbance torques as high as 6.19 mNm at the orbital
altitude floor of 1000 km. Between use of mid-size
reaction wheels and substantial magnetic torquer bars, a
total control authority of 13.10 mNm provides a control
Kalmanson

5

21st Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

Because the ST9-SSM mission occurs in low Earth
orbit, downlink of high data volumes does not present a
challenge.

Once all mission torques are understood, an attitude
error and control budget can be determined, as
summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Attitude Control Budget
Error Source

Hydrazine Propulsion System
A hydrazine propulsion system provided delta-V for
launch vehicle orbit insertion error correction, orbit
raising, and orbit disposal at end of life. Because the
sail is a large gossamer structure that cannot be
retracted once it is deployed, care was needed in
planning a disposal scenario that would allow the
sailcraft to be under active control until it passes below
the 575 km altitude level. At this altitude and below,
natural orbit decay will cause the sailcraft to break up
harmlessly within a very short period of time as it
tumbles while its final orbit decays. In order to
minimize drag and aid in attitude stability while
transferring to the disposal orbit, the sailcraft changes
its configuration to resemble a shuttlecock, as shown in
Figure 7.

3σ (arcsec)

Spacecraft Attitude Knowledge Error Budget
Attitude Knowledge Requirement

360

1. RSS of Static or Quasi-Static Errors

70

2. RSS of Slow Dynamic Errors

30

3. RSS of Fast Dynamic Errors

0

Total Attitude Knowledge Error

100

Attitude Knowledge Margin

260

Spacecraft Attitude Stability Error Budget
Attitude Stability Requirement
1. RSS of Static or Quasi-Static Errors
2. RSS of Slow Dynamic Errors
3. RSS of Fast Dynamic Errors
Total Attitude Stability Error
Attitude Stability Margin

1800
0
0
406
406
1394

Spacecraft Attitude Control Error Budget
Attitude Control Requirement
1. RSS of Static or Quasi-Static Errors

1800
70

2. RSS of Slow Dynamic Errors

421

3. RSS of Fast Dynamic Errors

400

Total Attitude Control Error

891

Attitude Control Margin

909

Image Processing
Another mission challenge unique to the demonstration
nature of the ST9-SSM mission is the need for good
image data during sail deployment and during thrust
measurement to validate the ground-based models for
deployment asymmetries and sail shape when sailing.
By mounting cameras on corners of the spacecraft bus,
which sits at the center of the sail, the desired image
data could be collected. While the proposed camera
system was capable of internally performing its own
image processing, the final decision of where image
processing would be performed was to be determined
during Phase B. This created a new challenge to the
bus design: how to process and downlink high volumes
of data without adding the substantial mass associated
with a solid state recorder or similar device.

Figure 7: Altered Sail Configuration Enhances
Active Control During Maneuver to Safe Disposal
Orbit4
Before the sail could be deployed and sailed in low
Earth orbit, the mission orbit must be reached. The
NASA guidelines for the ST9 mission stipulated access
to space as a secondary payload via the Reduced Height
Delta Payload Attach Fitting (RH-DPAF) within a
Delta II launch vehicle, with alternative access possible
as a single payload on a Pegasus XL launch vehicle.
Because both options provide substantially different
orbit access, two mission scenarios were created that

ST9-SSM chose instead to perform data reduction and
data management entirely within the on-board
spacecraft avionics.
Using an image reduction
algorithm provided by the payload team, the payload
interface card (PIC) collects the raw image data from
the cameras, compresses it, and stores it for downlink.
Kalmanson
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Figure 8: Launch Vehicle Envelope Restrictions

Table 4: Pegasus XL Launch Vehicle Delta V
Budget Drives Propulsion Subsystem Design

achieve solar sail demonstration objectives in the
desired mission orbit envelope of a circular, sunsynchronous orbit with an altitude no lower than
1000 km and no higher than 1400 km. These mission
scenarios included differences in orbit raising and
disposal requirements.

Delta V
(m/s)

Propella
nt Mass
(kg)

40

5.8

Orbit Raising to Mission Orbit (No Orbit
Raising Required with Delta II RHDPAF Option)

0

0

End-of-Life Disposal: Transfer from
1400x1400 km to 1400x575 km Altitude
Orbit

226

20.9

13

1.5

279

28.2

40

5.8

Maneuver
Delta II RH-DPAF Launched Mission

Additionally, each launch vehicle possibility posed its
own restrictions, but the height restrictions for the Delta
II RH-DPAF were easily accommodated by interior
arrangement of the spacecraft components. Since the
Delta II RH-DPAF could provide direct injection into
the ST9-SSM mission orbit, the propulsion system for
this launch vehicle option only needs to accommodate
insertion error and disposal but not orbit raising. The
driving challenges to mass and propulsion system
capability were presented by the Pegasus XL option.
By coordinating the worst case restrictions of each
launch vehicle possibility (the directed vehicle and its
alternate) a single robust solution was generated that
could be launched on either launch vehicle.

Launch Vehicle Dispersion Correction

Orbit Raising to Mission Orbit: Transfer
from 220x1000 km Injection Orbit to
1020x1020 km Altitude Orbit

218

30.40

To accommodate the Delta II RH-DPAF, the entire
sailcraft stowed needed to be less than 132.1 cm in total
height, as shown in Figure 8. The mass constraint
posed by the Pegasus XL is met as described previously

Transfer from 1270x1270 to 575x1270
km Altitude Evolved Orbit

174

22.1

Kalmanson

5% Finite Burn Penalty
Total for Delta II RH-DPAF
Configuration
Pegasus XL Launched Mission
Launch Vehicle Dispersion Correction

5% Finite Burn Penalty
Total for Pegasus Configuration
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22

1.6

454
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21st Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

Figure 10: Propulsion Subsystem Block Diagram Shows Use of REA Valve Strategy to Minimize Propellant
Leaks

The ST9-SSM propulsion subsystem met these
challenges with a two-headed approach. First, the
propulsion subsystem design used rocket engine
assemblies (REAs) that employ dual seat / dual coil
solenoid valves and a latch valve at the output of the
fuel tank to ensure redundant capability to seal the
system and prevent a potential hydrazine leak, as shown

by careful component selection and a highly efficient
avionics configuration.
Taking worst case of the delta V requirements for each
launch possibility, as shown in Table 4, a propulsion
system could be designed that would be viable on either
option.
The propulsion system originally used on Orbital’s
Glory/VCL, shown in Figure 9, provided a heritage
baseline design consisting of components that met the
worst case delta-V and mass constraints of each of the
possible launch vehicle scenarios.
Preventing propulsion leaks was also critical to
accomplishing the objectives of the ST9-SSM mission.
Use of a hydrazine propulsion system presents two
significant challenges. First, hydrazine is damaging to
the membrane material used for the sail. Also, in order
to validate the solar radiation pressure thrust models,
the measured thrust must be shown to clearly originate
from solar radiation pressure only, and that if any
component of the thrust had other origin, such as a
propellant leak, that this contribution could be
quantified.

Kalmanson
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Subsystem Provides Sufficient Delta-V for Orbit
Raising and End-of-Mission Disposal
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Figure 11: High Heritage Components and Unified Avionics Yields High-Capability, Low-Risk System
Kalmanson
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Figure 12: Flight Software Validation Occurs with Each Successive Build

integrate the avionics in order to meet driving mission
requirements, the cards within the MAU contained
strong heritage and well-understood configuration
requirements. The MAU drew its heritage from the Air
Force DSX-5 mission, currently to launch in 2008.

in the block diagram in Figure 10. Second, in order to
determine whether any tiny amounts of propellant had
leaked through the REA valve, measurements of the
catalyst bed temperatures provided data that could be
used to compute very tiny propellant leaks. While leak
measurement is generally performed by measuring
propellant tank pressure directly, this method did not
provide sufficient sensitivity to accommodate solar sail
thrust model validation.
However, because any
propellant traveling through the catalyst beds heats
them up, measuring catalyst bed temperatures provided
the required precision in determining propellant leaks.

Risk is also managed by defining a clear development
and test protocol in which all new development is
incrementally verified before integration, as shown in
Figure 12. Each component added to the system first
undergoes extensive unit testing before being integrated
with the system, reducing the risk associated with each
of those components as early the life cycle as possible.

PROGRAMMATIC CHALLENGES
Achieving the technical solution to accommodate the
drivers described above within the required cost cap
and within the NASA direction for maintaining margin
demanded a spacecraft bus solution that could reliably
provide credible cost and schedule performance as
mission needs evolve with concept development.
Risk Management
One common way to manage risk on a program is to
minimize the amount of new design required to make
the mission viable. ST9-SSM used this approach by
sequestering the majority of new development to the
sail experiment. This meant that the spacecraft bus
must represent a robust solution of known components
in a well-understood configuration. Figure 11 shows
the system block diagram breakdown of component
heritage level.
By minimizing the number of new components, and by
putting components together in configurations familiar
to previous missions, development risk associated with
the bus is minimized. While it was desirable to

Kalmanson
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Figure 14: Software Development and Verification Facility Allows Incremental Software Builds in a FlightLike Environment

Flight software development on the ST9-SSM mission
also presented unique risks due to the fact that the
payload processing software would be integrated into
the spacecraft avionics. Further complicating the flight
software tasks is the need to define efficient handover
of spacecraft control authority between the payloads
and the spacecraft bus. The potential impacts of these
risks were mitigated through the use of comprehensive
Interface Control Documents (ICD) and a series of
working group meetings that would clearly establish
boundaries of scope and interfaces for both software
development teams.

thrusting, it does need to be able to maintain a stable
attitude for taking data, and to account for the lowthrust orbit perturbations from the sail to the orbit
determination algorithm.
Attitude control was
discussed previously, but the other task of properly
propagating orbit while under sail thrust falls to the
flight software. Since this sort of computation is novel,
and also because part of the purpose of the mission is to
validate the ground-based thrust models, the solution
chosen relied on a conventional (i.e., non-low thrust)
flight-tested, high precision orbit propagator on-orbit,
and measured GPS data correlated with ground-based
measurements. The difference between the on-orbit
propagator and the measured position data are then fed
into the experimental, ground-based thrust model to
validate the experimental model.
This allows
maximum use of existing flight software with on-orbit
heritage to minimize cost and development risk.

Very few missions have a payload that can control the
spacecraft independently of the spacecraft bus’s
resources. ST9-SSM featured not one but two such
payloads: the sail itself for thrust and the translating
stage for attitude control. While the sail is deployed, it
is providing thrust to the sailcraft. Although the bus
does not need to take direct action to assist the sail

The other challenge posed to the spacecraft bus by a
payload taking intermittent control is that posed by the
translating stage’s attitude control algorithm. The
challenges to the spacecraft bus here are to hand over
control of the sailcraft gracefully to the payload, to
monitor sailcraft attitude, and to slew the sailcraft up to
180° in a reasonably short time to regain the sun in case

At each point in which integration of a new subsystem
occurs, the system undergoes incremental testing,
culminating in highly comprehensive final end-to-end
tests of the fully completed and integrated system
before delivery to the launch site.
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estimates of expected ST9-SSM costs could be
generated.

of an attitude error. The control authority to provide
the spacecraft slew is discussed in the section on
attitude control. However, flight software that is smart
enough to know when to step in and retake control
presented a new development effort for ST9-SSM. To
minimize development risk, as much flight software
heritage code as possible was borrowed from previous
missions, including the DART mission, which
performed a rendezvous with an existing on-orbit
satellite in April 2005. Using DART’s algorithms for
handing over and retaking control of the spacecraft as a
baseline allowed a template for ST9-SSM ICD
development. Added to this existing, flight heritage
software was an algorithm provided by the payload
team for determining how the translating stage would
be actuated in order to control attitude. Control would
pass from the spacecraft bus to the payload by
command, and return to spacecraft control either by
command or upon attitude error exceeding a preset
deadband, as shown in Figure 13.

CONCLUSION
Because the necessary and sufficient demonstration of a
working solar sail takes place in low Earth orbit, it
imposes novel gravity gradient and drag stresses on the
spacecraft bus design.
Follow-on solar sailing missions would require
increased power to support transmissions, and would
continue to require the lowest possible aerial density. A
bus supporting such missions would build on the lowmass, low-risk approach taken for the ST9-SSM
mission.
Orbital’s MicroStarTM spacecraft bus provides a
versatile and efficient option to support a solar sail
demonstration and follow-on solar sailing missions
because of its low mass, high capability, high heritage,
and flexible configuration options

Because of the complexity of the flight software
subsystem design, a highly flight-like development
environment is used to verify software on engineering
development units within their expected on-orbit
context. A block diagram of the Software Development
and Verification Facility is shown in Figure 14. By
continuously developing and verifying software units
on the SDVF before integrating with the rest of the
flight software, development risks associated with
unique flight software are minimized.
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Cost Control
Because of the $85M cost cap imposed by NASA for
the ST9-SSM mission, each cost driver had to be
carefully scrutinized for its relevance to the mission,
with an eye toward finding requirements that could be
modified to reduce unnecessary cost drivers. Two of
the biggest cost drivers on any program are schedule
and subcontracted items, and ST9-SSM was no
exception. ST9-SSM’s long development schedule—
four years from hardware start to launch—meant that
careful control was needed over level of effort services,
and that appropriate steps were needed to ensure that
personnel would be available for bursts of effort
followed by periods of relatively low effort. While the
long development schedule was necessary for
technology validation, it imposed cost and schedule
burdens on the spacecraft provider in order to maintain
sufficient staff to meet program longevity requirements.
Costs associated with subcontracted components were
minimized by specifying build-to-print configurations
wherever possible. By relying on past cost data from
missions that have already flown, precise and accurate
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